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ABSTRACT
The rise of machine learning as a service and model sharing plat-
forms has raised the need of traitor-tracing the models and proof
of authorship. Watermarking technique is the main component of
existing methods for protecting copyright of models. In this paper,
we show that distillation, a widely used transformation technique,
is a quite effective attack to remove watermark embedded by ex-
isting algorithms. The fragility is due to the fact that distillation
does not retain the watermark embedded in the model that is re-
dundant and independent to the main learning task. We design
ingrain in response to the destructive distillation. It regularizes a
neural network with an ingrainer model, which contains the wa-
termark, and forces the model to also represent the knowledge of
the ingrainer. Our extensive evaluations show that ingrain is more
robust to distillation attack and its robustness against other widely
used transformation techniques is comparable to existing methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models are becoming ubiquitous, powering
an extremely wide variety of applications. As a consequence, they
are being treated as conventional commodity softwares. The model
training could be outsourced, and the constructed models could
be shared among various parties. Cloud service providers, such
as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft provide machine learning as a
service which enables outsourcing machine learning and facilitates
using third-party models. Many companies, such as BigML, also
operate exclusively on platforms that enable sharing and selling
machine learning models. As ML models are treated as an intellec-
tual property, which can be sold or licensed, the needs of traitor-
tracing and proof of authorship emerge. One can “watermark” the
model during its training by implanting some secret into its pa-
rameters, which can then be used to prove one’s authorship on the
model[2, 11, 33, 42, 49]. Compared to watermarking multimedia
data, watermarking ML models poses new technical challenges
since it is the model’s functionality trained for a specific task that
need to be protected.
A number of basic techniques are proposed in the literature for
embedding secret information in neural networks, such as poison-
ing training data [2, 3, 13, 33, 46], modifying the training algorithm
and retraining [11, 20, 32, 33, 42, 46], or simply writing the secrets
into the (e.g., least significant bits of) parameters after the train-
ing [46]. Some existing methods exploit the large capacity of neural
networks in representing and memorizing random functions [4, 51],
without damaging the model’s accuracy [41]. Others exploit the
massive unused capacity of the models’ parameter space, which is
largely redundant for the main classification function represented
by the model [22]. Nonetheless, what is missing in the design of
the existing watermarking techniques is that they are not designed
strategically with countermeasures in mind. In fact, it is a common
practice that models go through some transformations for memory,
energy and computation optimization [12, 16, 21–23, 26, 28, 53],
for fine-tuning with new data [18], or for transfer learning [36, 37].
These transformations can be actively used as attacks to remove
watermarks in neural networks [2, 11, 33, 42, 49]. Unfortunately,
little has been studied about the impact of model transformations
on the result of existing watermark embedding mechanisms.
In this paper, we show that one of the widely used transforma-
tion techniques—distillation [26]—is surprisingly a quite effective
attack to remove the embedded watermarks. Distillation, as a type
of compression techniques, uses the knowledge of the neural net-
work to train a new model of smaller size. We evaluate existing
watermarking methods under distillation attack. The results em-
pirically show that all the watermark information embedded in
a neural network, using any of the existing methods, can be re-
moved by distillation with negligible loss in the model’s accuracy.
We perform a deep analysis on the results obtained. Our analy-
sis reveals that existing methods which simply leverage the vast
capacity of neural networks, leads to the embedded watermarks
decoupled from the model’s main functionality. More specifically,
the sub-models or parameters which are responsible for memoriz-
ing the watermarks are almost independent from the part of the
model which represents the main classification task. As distillation
is constrained to preserve the model’s accuracy, the redundant in-
formation (which contains the watermarks, but does not contribute
to the distillation’s objective) will be lost.
In response to the fragility of existing watermarking methods
against distillation, we design ingrain, a more robust watermarking
method to counter distillation. Ingrain essentially imbues the wa-
termarks onto the predictions of the model on real (benign) data.
The objective is to embed the watermark information into the same
neural connections that are responsible for representing the main
classification task. We achieve this by ingraining the watermarks in
the main model’s predictions through modifying the loss function
of the classifier. We execute this in two steps. First, we train an in-
grainer model exclusively on a watermark-carrier dataset (which is
derived from the watermark information). The ingrainer model has
the same input-output format as the main classification model and
contains all the watermark information (recoverable without any
loss). In the second step, we use the loss function of the ingrainer
as a regularization term for training the main classification model,
so as to encourage the model to not only match the label for each
training input, but also to match the output of the ingrainer on
the same training data. Informally, this leads to a joint training of
the classification model and the watermarking model, as opposed
to independent training of the two objectives inside a model. By
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tuning the weight of the regularization term, we can trade-off the
accuracy loss with the watermark robustness.
We extensively evaluated ingrain for various machine learning
tasks and model architectures on multiple training datasets. The
results show that, with acceptable accuracy loss, it improves the
resistance of the embedded watermarks against distillation. For
example, on one of the datasets, 30% of the watermarks survive dis-
tillation with only 2% loss in the classification accuracy. Although
ingrain is designed to counter distillation, it turns out that its robust-
ness against other widely used transformations is comparable to
existing methods. This work highlights that even if the neural net-
work is transformed into a different model via a strong attack (i.e.,
distillation), it is still possible to preserve watermark information if
it is deeply “ingrained” in the model’s main functionality.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contribu-
tions in this paper.
• We empirically show that distillation is an effective attack
which can remove all watermark information in neural net-
works embedded by existing methods.
• We perform a deep analysis of the robustness of existing meth-
ods. We argue that minimizing the independence between the
main task and the watermark embedding task inside a model
can improve the robustness. Nonetheless, it intuitively harms
the model’s accuracy. We highlight the problem of studying
the trade-off between embedding robustness and cost.
• We design ingrain as an embedding technique to counter dis-
tillation. The watermark is embedded in such a way that it is
correlated with the model’s main task. We empirically show
that ingrain can achieve better robustness against distillation.
Besides, we also show that the robustness of ingrain against
other widely used transformations (attacks) is comparable to
existing methods.
2 MACHINE LEARNING MODEL LIFECYCLE
In this paper, we focus on supervised learning, more specifically,
on training classification models using (deep) neural networks [31].
The model is used to give predictions to inputs provided by users.
2.1 Machine Learning Models
A machine learning model, e.g., a neural network, encodes a gen-
eral hypothesis function Fw (with parametersw) which is learned
from a training dataset with the goal of making predictions on
unseen data. The function maps some input space X to an output
space Y (e.g., labels). A neural network classification model Fw (x)
predicts the class for input x ∈ X using a multi-layer network of
basic non-linear activation functions (neurons) whose connections
are weighted according to the model parametersw . Each neuron
obtains a number of activation signals from neurons in its pre-
ceding layer, whose importance weights are determined by their
associated model parameters. Then, it computes a non-linear ac-
tivation function on the weighted sum of its input signals (plus
a bias signal), and passes it to the neurons in the next layer. An
example of a widely used activation function is the rectified linear
unit relu(z) =max(0, z), which we will also be using in our experi-
ments. In a classification model, a layer of normalized exponential
function softmax(z)i = exp(zi /T )∑
j exp(zj /T ) , where T is the temperature,
is added to the activation signals of the last layer to convert their
arbitrary values into a vector of real values in [0, 1] that sum up to
1. Thus, the output could be interpreted as the probability that the
input falls into each class.
2.2 Training & Regularization
Let x be the data drawn from the underlying data distribution px (x),
and y be the class of x. The training goal is to find the parameters
w such that the model Fw is a good approximation of the mapping
between every data point (x,y) in the space X ×Y. The accuracy
of the model in this approximation is tested using a loss function
L(Fw (x),y) that measures the difference between the class y and
the model’s prediction Fw (x). A common choice of L for classifi-
cation models is the cross entropy loss function [34]. The training
objective is to find a function Fw which minimizes the expected
loss.
L(Fw ) = Ex∼px [L(Fw (x),y)] (1)
It is intractable to accurately represent the actual probability
function px (x), but in practice, we can estimate it using samples
drawn from it. These samples form the training set D ⊂ X. Hence,
we can train the model to minimize the empirical loss over the
training set D.
LD (Fw ) = 1|D |
∑
x∈D
L(Fw (x),y) (2)
Learning the optimal parameters is a non-linear optimization
problem. Algorithms used for solving this problem are variants
of the gradient descent algorithm [6]. Stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) [52] is a very efficient method that updates the parameters
by gradually computing the average gradient on small randomly
selected subsets of the training data.
The SGD algorithm navigates high dimensional space of the
parameters to finds a local optimum of the loss function on the
training data. This could lead to an overfitted model which attains a
very low prediction error on its training data, but fails to generalize
well for unseen data. Various regularization techniques have been
introduced to mitigate this issue [31]. These approaches try to pre-
vent the parameter values from arbitrarily adapting to the training
data. This can be achieved by augmenting the training set, by adding
a regularization term R(Fw ) to the loss LD (Fw ) for penalizing large
parameters, or by randomly dropping the network connections dur-
ing the training to prevent their complex co-adaptation during the
training [47]. The training process of a model can be summarized
as to find a model Fw that minimizes the following objective.
C(Fw ) = LD (Fw ) + λR(Fw ) (3)
where the regularization factor λ controls the balance between the
classification function and the regularization function.
3 WATERMARK EMBEDDING
Given a watermark S , watermark embedding in a model Fw refers
to a process where the owner of Fw embeds S into Fw in the training
phase of the model, and later extracts S from Fw after its release to
prove ownership on it.
In this section, we first formulate the watermark representation,
and then introduce various embedding techniques in the literature.
2
Next, we introduce distillation and other widely used transforma-
tion techniques of ML models which can be used as attacks to
remove watermarks. We then analyze the robustness of existing
embedding methods against distillation.
3.1 Watermark Representation
The watermark S is typically represented as n bits of information
that carries the watermark in the model Fw . The owner can ex-
tract the n bits of watermark information from Fw as a proof of
ownership. Alternatively, the watermark can be encoded asm pre-
defined data-label pairs in a classification task with k classes, where
m = ⌈ n⌊log2(k)⌋ ⌉. Let DS = {xs1, xs2, · · · , xsm } represent the pre-
defined data sequence drawn from some data distribution ps , and
YS = {ys 1,ys 2, · · · ,ysm } represent the predefined label sequence.
The embedding goal is to enforce a hidden function Fw (xsi ) = ys i
in the model Fw for each xsi ∈ DS , such that the owner can later
obtain YS by providing DS to Fw . The sequence DS is referred to
as watermark-carrier dataset in the rest of our paper. Note that the
watermark-carrier data distribution ps should be different from the
training data distribution px . For example, one common way is
to generate DS randomly as the i-th draw from a pseudo-random
function.
3.2 Existing Embedding Methods
Depending on the watermark representation, the watermark S
could be embedded in the model’s parameters w , or the model’s
predictions Fw (x) on the watermark-carrier set DS . Following the
same spirit of generic watermarking techniques [14], the embed-
ding should meet two requirements, i.e., fidelity and robustness.
Fidelity requires the performance of the host network (i.e., the neu-
ral network to which the watermark bit vector is embedded into)
is not impaired by the embedding, while robustness requires the
embedded watermark to be detectable even if the host network
undergoes modifications.
3.2.1 Embedding in Parametersw . Essentially, this problem is to
embed a n-bit vector S ∈ {0, 1}n intow of a given neural network
(host network). The avenues where existing methods embed the
watermark intow typically falls into 4 classes: the least significant
bit(s) ofw , the signs ofw , correlation withw and statistics ofw .
Least significant bit(s) ofw (W:LSB). Leveraging an observation
that high-precision parameters are not necessary for high perfor-
mance of the model [22], Song et al. [46] investigated embedding
the secret bit vector directly into the least significant bit(s) of the
network parameters. They show that given a CNN model com-
prising 880K parameters and trained on the LFW dataset [27], the
adversary can embed up to 17.6M bits at a cost of 0.14% decrease
in test accuracy of the model.
Signs ofw (W:SGN). Another avenue that the model owner can
exploit to embed his watermark is the signs of the model parameters
[46]. In particular, given a watermark bit vector S ∈ {−1, 1}n , the
owner would like to force the sign ofwi to match that of Si . The
owner can achieve this by adding a penalty term P to the original
loss function. P is defined as:
P(w, S) = λS
n
n∑
i=1
|max(0,−wiSi )| (4)
where λS controls the magnitude of the penalty. The penalty is
minimal (i.e., zero) whenwi and Si have the same sign.
Correlation withw (W:COR). Alternatively, themodel owner can
embed the watermark S ∈ Rl into the model parameters w by
adding a correlation term C to the loss function that is employed
during training [46], so as to maximize the correlation betweenw
and S . The correlation term C(w, S) is defined as:
C(w, S) = −λc ·
|∑li=1(wi − w¯)(Si − S¯)|√∑l
i=1(wi − w¯)2
√∑l
i=1(Si − S¯)2
(5)
where l is number of parameters, λc is the level of correlation and
w¯, S¯ are mean values ofw, S , respectively.
Statistics ofw (W:STA). Uchida et al. [49] have investigated a
problem of embedding watermarks into the statistical information
of w by the use of a regularization term ER (w, S) defined in the
following.
ER (w, S) = −
n∑
j=1
(Sj log(yj ) + (1 − Sj ) log(1 − yj )) (6)
where yj = σ (∑i X jiwi ) and σ (x) = 11+exp(−x ) . The matrix X is an
embedding parameter (secret key) with size n ×M , whereM is the
size of the network parametersw . The regularization term enforces
w to have a certain statistical bias reflecting the embedded water-
mark. Experimental studies show that the watermark embedding
incurs minimal effect on the performance of the host network (e.g.,
increase a test error rate on CIFAR-10 dataset by only 1% [49]). They
also show that the watermark remains detectable in the event the
host network undergoes fine-tuning and compression by pruning.
Nevertheless, we show later in our evaluation that the embedded
watermark is detached if the host network is distilled. Besides, the
parameter sizeM in a neural network is usually numerous. Thus,
the embedding parameter X (with size n ×M) consumes massive
memory especially when the watermark size n is large. In prac-
tice, the amount of watermark embedded by this approach is quite
limited.
Similarly, Chen et al. [11] and Rouhani et al.[42] also add a
regularization term to embed a watermark in the probability density
function of the model’s parameters or neurons’ activations.
3.2.2 Embedding in Predictions Fw (x). (P:CAP). The capability
of neural networks to “memorize” random noise [51] suggests that
the model owner can force the model to “memorize” the watermark
of his choice, and then rely on the model’s predictions Fw (x) to
extract the watermark [46]. In particular, the owner synthesizes
a set of records, and assigns to them labels YS that encode the
watermark he wants to embed, obtaining a labeled watermark-
carrier set DS . He then poisons the training data set D with the
synthetic data set DS . Finally, he trains the model on the poisoned
training set using a standard training pipeline. When Fw becomes
overfitted on DS , the owner can extract the watermark from model
predictions Fw (x) by querying Fw with DS . Experimental results
show that the amount of embedded information is equivalent to
the pixel information of 25 images in the CIFAR-10 dataset at a cost
of 0.69% decrease in the test accuracy of the model [46].
Similarly, Adi et al. [2] watermark a neural network by re-training
it on a random set DS with random labels YS as the watermark.
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Merrer et al. [33] use a set of adversarial examples of a neural net-
work to convey the watermark information via a set of queries of
them.
3.3 Watermark Removal Attacks: Model
Transformations
Given a trained model, transformation techniques aim at deriving a
new model with the same or slightly different prediction task with
additional features such as memory and computational efficiency,
for example when the model is going to be used in mobile applica-
tions. It might also be needed for transfer learning, updating the
model using fine tuning, or further regularizing the model. Many of
the transformation techniques make use of an extra refining set D ′
in connection with the original model Fw to update or reconstruct it
as F ′w . The model transformations can be used as attacks to remove
the embedded watermarks in neural networks [2, 11, 33, 42, 49].
Although there are many transformation techniques proposed in
the literature, in this section, we only list the major techniques for
deep neural networks, which are commonly used in practice.
Model Compression. The objective here is to optimize the mem-
ory needed to fit the (parameters of the) model, while preserving
the accuracy of the model. The compression can be achieved by
removing insignificant parameters and pruning their links between
neurons [23] (which is often followed by fine tuning the remaining
parameters using the refining set to further make use of them),
limiting the number of required bits to represent the model’s pa-
rameters [22], or grouping parameters into a few hash buckets [12].
Distillation [26] is another type of compression, where the orig-
inal model’s knowledge could be distilled into another model of
smaller size, for example by reducing the number of neurons in each
layer. Essentially, the knowledge of the original model Fw,T (teacher
model) is represented as its predictions on a refining dataset D ′
(which is drawn from px ) under temperatureT in the softmax func-
tion (see Section 2.1). The temperature T is usually set larger than
1 so as to make the teacher model Fw,T produce a softer prediction
(i.e., softer probability distribution over classes), which encodes
more knowledge of Fw,T . The smaller model F ′w (student model)
is then trained on D ′ with combination of the soft predictions pro-
duced by Fw,T and hard labels which are determined by the ground
truth labels of D ′.
Fine Tuning. A very common practice in machine learning is
to refine and update a model using new data. In the fine tuning
process, an existing model Fw is updated by simply training a new
model F ′w on a refining set D ′, while the initial parameters of F ′w
are set to those of Fw [18].
Transfer Learning. This transformation technique is used to up-
date the classification task of a model Fw to a related yet slightly
different task [36, 37]. It often retains the lower layers of the origi-
nal model, which usually extract generic features, and fine-tunes or
retrains the last few layers using the refining set D ′ as the training
set for the new model F ′w .
Computation Optimization. The computation time for predic-
tions on a test input is often not negligible for (deep) convolutional
neural networks. Using a technique known as low-rank expansion,
it has been shown that approximating the convolutional layers of a
model by linear combinations of smaller filters can accelerate the
Table 1: Robustness of existing and our (P:ING) embedding
methods. The accuracies of the main classification task and
the watermark extraction are presented in white and gray
columns respectively. The host network is a fully-connected
multilayer perceptron (MLP) trained onMNIST dataset. The
size ofwatermark-carrier setDS is 1,000 images.Weperform
removal attacks on the embedded network including distil-
lation (with temperature 5), pruning (with rate 0.4), round-
ing (by 2 digits) and fine tuning.
Embed AttackDistillation Pruning Rounding Fine Tuning
W:LSB 0.98 1.00 0.98 0 0.97 0.24 0.97 0 0.99 0.27
W:SGN 0.98 1.00 0.98 0 0.98 0.53 0.98 0.75 0.99 0.59
W:COR 0.98 0.99 0.98 0 0.97 0.42 0.97 0.41 0.99 0.48
W:STA 0.98 0.80 0.98 0 0.98 0.77 0.99 0.80 0.98 0.80
P:CAP 0.98 1.00 0.98 0 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00
P:ING 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.23 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00
network’s computation [28, 53]. In other words, a convolutional
layer in a pre-trained model is decomposed into more convolu-
tional layers with smaller filters, thus reducing the computation
complexity [28].
3.4 Robustness of Existing Embedding
Methods
We first present part of our experimental results on the robustness
of existing embedding methods in Table 1. The result shows that
distillation is a strong attack which can remove all the embedded
watermarks by existing methods. Nonetheless, our method (P:ING)
preserves much more watermark information after distillation. Be-
sides, it also achieves comparable robustness to the best result of
existing methods against other attacks.
Embedding S into parametersw (i.e., W:∗methods) is inherently
fragile in attacks that alter w or the model architecture. For ex-
ample, parameter pruning and rounding for compression purpose
can completely remove watermarks embedded by W:LSB method.
Distilling the model’s knowledge to another model of smaller size
from scratch destroys all the watermarks because it has a fresh
model architecture and training process.
In existing methods that embed the watermarks into the model’s
predictions (i.e., P:CAP method), the watermark-carrier set DS is
synthesized randomly with labels on the owner’s will, so it is noise
data to the model in terms of the main classification task. A series
of recent studies has indicated that a model fits the noise data by
“memorization” instead of extracting general patterns from it, and
learns the general patterns of the real data first before fitting noise
data [4]. Our experiments align with this phenomenon as shown
in Figure 1. The noise data DS is memorized in a later stage during
training after the model learns the most meaningful features on
D. This suggests that the embedded watermarks form a hidden
content (as a set of parameters and neural connections) that is
largely independent from themain classification task. In other words,
there is a negligible knowledge intersection between the main
classification task and the representation of watermarks in the
model. Exactly because of this independence, the hidden watermark
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Figure 1: Trajectories of training metrics on main task data
D and noise data DS . D is the test set of CIFAR10. The size of
DS is 1, 000 random images which have random labels.
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Figure 2: Watermark ingrain in a neural network classifier.
The goal is to train a classifier Fw that also carries the wa-
termarks represented by an ingrainer model Gθ . Gθ has the
same input-output format and architecture as Fw , and is pre-
trained on a watermark-carrier set DS (which together with
its label sequenceYS compose thewatermarks), so its param-
eters θ are fixed during the ingrain. During the ingrain, Fw ’s
training set D is augmented with DS for the classification
loss L(Fw (x),y) to reinforce the embedding of watermarks
in Fw . We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to update
Fw ’s parameters w , by jointly optimizing the classification
loss function and the ingrain loss function L(Fw,T (x),Gθ (x))
weighted by an ingrain coefficient λ. The ingrain loss acts
similarly as a regularizer and helps Fw ’s predictions on D
implicitly contain the watermark information.
functions are very fragile to distillation whose major objective or
constraint is to preserve the accuracy of the original model. Hence,
redundant and independent embedded watermarks can be easily
removed.
4 INGRAIN
Drawing insights from the fragility of existing embedding meth-
ods especially to distillation, We introduce ingrain as a means to
deeply embed the watermarks into the model’s functionalities by
mitigating the independence between the watermark function and
the main classification function. We first present an overview of
ingrain technique. Next, we introduce the ingrainer model which
represents the watermarks. We then use it to regularize the training
of the classifier to embed the watermarks.
4.1 Overview
In ingrain, the watermark S is represented as the watermark-carrier
sequence DS and its label sequence YS in the embedding process.
Figure 2 illustrates the ingrain mechanism, which is an indirect
way of embedding watermarks in a neural network as opposed
to directly overfitting the model on the watermarks. The main
idea behind ingrain is to force the model to carry the watermark
information on its predictions on in-distribution data (i.e., data
sampled from the training data distribution px ). Thus, when the
model is attacked (i.e., distilled by using a refining datasetD ′ drawn
from px ), the watermark knowledge is also transferred along with
the model’s core knowledge on classifying D ′.
The main technique of ingrain is to explicitly represent the wa-
termark S using an additional model—ingrainer, and further ingrain
the watermark information implicitly in the classifier’s predictions
on training data D. Such watermark information is expected to
also appear in the classifier’s predictions on the refining dataset
D ′ which is used in the further distillation attack. This is achieved
by modifying its training process. In particular, the ingrainer Gθ ,
where θ are its parameters, can cast the watermark information to
its predictions implicitly on D. When training the classifier, such
ingrainer’s predictions work as an additional term in the loss func-
tion, so as to encourage the classifier to simultaneously learn the
ground-truth labels and the watermark information (in ingrainer’s
predictions) on the same training data D. Hence, the watermark
information is correlated with the classifier’s predictions onD in an
implicit way. Note that this does not mean the model owner extracts
the explicit watermark S using in-distribution inputs (i.e., training
dataD). It is actually the tricky part in the design of ingrainer where
its predictions on training set D carries the watermark information,
but the owner extracts the watermark S by querying the classifier
with a watermark-carrier set DS which is drawn from a different
distribution ps .
4.2 Ingrainer Model
The ingrainer model Gθ is used to represent the watermark in-
formation via its predictions on the training data D, such that it
can regularize the training of the classifier to ingrain watermark
information implicitly in the classifier’s predictions on training
data D.
The most straightforward way one might think of to fulfill such
mapping is to train the ingrainer model directly on a subsequence of
D labeled by a sequence YS which jointly compose the watermark
S . However, it has several issues. Let Dsub represent the chosen
subsequence. On the one hand, if Dsub is chosen in the way that
the ground-truth label of each data point xi ∈ Dsub is identical to
ys i ∈ YS , it is exactly the classification task and does not watermark
the model. On the other hand, if xi ’s ground-truth label is not ys i
and it is embedded as a hidden function, it watermarks the model
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but can be easily removed in attacks (e.g., distillation) that re-train
the model on a refining set.
We sample the watermark-carrier set DS from a different dis-
tribution ps to carry YS . We train the ingrainer, using the same
architecture as the classifier, to overfit on DS (see Algorithm 1).
Although this does not establish an explicit mapping from training
data D to the watermark S , it leads a part of the ingrainer’s con-
nections or parameters to memorize the watermark information.
When a training data passes through the ingrainer, it is expected to
trigger some of these connections, leading the output (prediction)
to encode some implicit watermark information. The same archi-
tecture as the classifier is expected to boost this implicit mapping.
Thus, the entire training set D is supposed to carry rich watermark
information in the ingrainer’s predictions. Although our experi-
mental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the ingrainer by
training it in this way, we believe it is not the only way. We leave an
investigation into various potentially effective ingrainers as future
work.
Algorithm 1: Training Ingrainer Gθ
Input :Watermark-carrier set DS , number of epochs P , learning
rate η, size of mini-batch q.
Output :Model parameters θ of ingrainer Gθ .
1 θ ← initialize(Gθ )
2 for p = 1 to P do
3 for each mini-batch {(xs j , ys j )}qj=1 ⊂ DS do
4 д ← ∇θ 1q
∑q
j=1 L(Gθ (xs j ), ys j )
5 θ ← updateParameters (η, θ, д)
6 end
7 end
4.3 Training Classifier
The training of the classifier Fw is regularized by the trained in-
grainer model Gθ to force Fw to learn two tasks together. Specifi-
cally, we add an additional term L(Fw,T (x),Gθ (x)) to the training
loss function L(Fw (x),y), where T determines the classifier’s tem-
perature in the softmax function. This term is referred to as ingrain
loss in the paper.
In the distillation attack, the classifier Fw,T becomes the teacher
model whose T is usually set larger than 1 to produce soft predic-
tions which also encode the watermark knowledge. The student
model learns the Fw,T ’s knowledge from the soft predictions. To
maximally preserve watermark information in such soft predic-
tions, we set a larger T for Fw,T in the ingrain loss to ingrain Gθ ’s
watermark information in Fw,T ’s soft predictions. It mitigates the
distance between the soft predictions Fw,T (x) on each training data
x and the watermark information Gθ (x) carried by x when pass-
ing through Gθ . This leads to a correlation of the classifier’s soft
predictions with the watermark information, which improves the
watermark’s resistance against the distillation attack. Note that the
ingrain process is similar to distillation where Gθ is the teacher
model and Fw,T is the student model. Nonetheless, we set a higher
T for the student model as opposed to the teacher model. Formally,
the loss function we are optimizing when training the classifier is
the following.
LD (Fw ) = 1|D |
∑
x∈D
L(Fw (x),y)
+ λL(Fw,T (x),Gθ (x))
(7)
where the ingrain coefficient λ determines the degree of ingrain.
Throughout the training process, the ingrainer is fixed, and we
use SGD (see Section 2.2) to optimize the classifier’s parameters
w . Each training data, that passes through the ingrainer, produces
one sample point in the watermark space. The classifier that is
regularized with these samples, tries to also solve for the watermark
function through the optimization process. Thus, by tuning the
ingrain coefficient λ, we can control the trade-off between the
prediction accuracy of the classifier and the degree to which the
watermark information is ingrained in the classifier’s predictions
on training data.
Explicitly embed watermarks into classifier. The ingrain loss im-
bues the classifier’s predictions on training data with implicit wa-
termark information, which can lead to better robustness against
distillation attack. Nonetheless, it does not explicitly embed the wa-
termarks into the classifier. Querying Fw with watermark-carrier
set DS might not obtain the YS with high accuracy. Therefore, we
augment (poison) the training data D with DS in the training of
Fw using loss function L(Fw (x),y). This is to further enforce the
embedding into the unused parameter space of the model. In this
case, when the ingrain coefficient λ is set to 0, the whole process
becomes equivalent to the existing P:CAP method that exploit the
neural networks’ large capacity [46]. The watermark information
that is passed to the classifier through poisoning D with DS is not
expected to be resistant to distillation attack, but it helps boosting
the accuracy of the watermark extraction for the case of simple
attacks, e.g., parameter pruning, rounding.
A further interesting finding is that such augmentation imposes
negligible influence on the ingrain loss as shown in Figure 3. This
result demonstrates the independence of the sub-models that are
responsible for memorizing the watermarks and the part of the
model which represents the classification task, as in the case of ex-
isting P:CAP method [46]. Such independence leads to the fragility
of P:CAP against distillation attack. In summary, the whole process
of training the classifier is shown in Algorithm 2, where we shuffle
D and DS (line 2), and extract them in each mini-batch (line 5-6)
to apply separate losses on them (line 7-9). The weighted average
gradient is used to update the parametersw (line 10-11).
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we perform an empirical comparison of existing
watermark embedding methods and ingrain. We first introduce
the datasets and models we used, and the embedding methods and
removal techniques we evaluated. Then, we compare them in both
embedding performance and embedding robustness.
5.1 Datasets & Models
We perform the evaluation on benchmark image datasets including
CIFAR10 [29] and MNIST [30]. We train convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) and fully-connected multi-layer perceptron (MLP) for
these datasets.
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Figure 3: Ingrain loss on the training data D in the training
of the classifier. (Top) D is not augmented. (Bottom) We use
DS to augment D in the classification loss. The host network
is a MLP model. D is MNIST dataset. The size of DS is 1, 000
images. The ingrain temperature T is 10. The ingrain coeffi-
cient λ is 2.
Algorithm 2: Training Classifier Fw
Input :Training dataset D = {(xj , yj )}ni=1, watermark-carrier set
DS = {(xs j , ys j )}mi=1, Ingrainer Gθ , number of epochs P ,
learning rate η, ingrain coefficient λ, ingrain temperature T .
Output :Model parameters w of classifier Fw .
1 w ← initialize(Fw )
2 DA ← shuffle(D ∪ DS )
3 for p = 1 to P do
4 for each mini-batch b ⊂ DA do
5 {(xj , yj )}aj=1 ← getTrainData(b)
6 {(xs j , ys j )}bj=1 ← getWatermarkCarrier(b)
7 дD ← ∇w 1a
∑a
j=1 L(Fw (xj ), yj )
8 +λL(Fw,T (xj ), Gθ (x))
9 дDS ← ∇w 1b
∑b
j=1 L(Fw (xs j ), ys j )
10 д ← (aдD + bдDS )/(a + b)
11 w ← updateParameters (η, w, д)
12 end
13 end
• MNIST [30]. This is a dataset composed of 70,000 handwrit-
ten digit images with size 28×28 in 10 classes. We rescale each
image to value range [0, 1].Model. We use a fully-connected
neural network with the same architecture as in [26]. Specifi-
cally, it has two hidden layers of 1200 rectified linear neurons.
Each fully-connected layer is regularized using dropout 0.5.We
train the model in mini-batch size 128, using the Adadelta [50]
optimizer with initial learning rate 0.1, ρ 0.95, and ε 1e-8.
• CIFAR10 [29]. It consists of 32×32 color images in 10 classes.
It has 50,000 training records and 10,000 test records. We
rescale each image to value range [0, 1]. Model. We train
a standard convolutional neural network (CNN) with the same
architecture as in [38]. Specifically, it is a succession of 2 con-
volutional layers with 64 (3×3) filters, a max pooling layer,
2 convolutional layers with 128 (3×3) filters, a max pooling
layer, and 2 fully connected layers with 256 neurons. Each
fully-connected layer is regularized with dropout 0.5. We set
the mini-batch size to 128. We use SGD with momentum 0.9
to optimize the model. The initial learning rate is set to 0.01,
and decays 0.95 every 10 epochs.
5.2 Embedding Techniques
We evaluate the following embedding techniques.
• W:LSB [46], embedding into the least significant bit(s) of pa-
rameters. Trained for 500 epochs.
• W:SGN [46], embedding into the sign of parameters. Trained
for 500 epochs.
• W:COR [46], embedding into parameters by making them
correlated to the watermarks. Trained for 500 epochs.
• W:STA [49], embedding into the statistical information of
parameters. Trained for 500 epochs.
• P:CAP [2, 46], embedding into predictions on a watermark-
carrier set through capacity abuse. Trained for 500 epochs.
• P:ING, embedding into predictions through ingrain. We train
the ingrainer for 1,000 epochs, and train the classifier for 500
epochs. We perform ingrain 5 times with ingrain coefficient λ
of 0.5, 1, 2, 4, and 8 respectively.We set the ingrain temperature
T to 10 during ingrain, because we empirically find it gives
the best overall embedding robustness.
Watermark-carrier set DS . Similar to the setting of the P:CAP
method [46], we composeDS by randomly generating images using
a pseudorandom number generator based on a random seed. Such
data points could be generated in many different ways, for example,
white noise, uniformly random noise, one-hot images [46], and
random walk. Random walk starts from the center of a blank image
and moves by one pixel of random value at a random direction for
many steps—which we set to the size of the image. In our experi-
ments, we observe that random-walk images are more effective in
practice (i.e., easier to embed with less accuracy overhead). We use
it to generate DS . Totally, we have synthesized three DS sets with
size 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 watermark-carrier images respectively.
Each DS set is labeled with a sequence YS which jointly compose
the watermarks. For W:∗ methods, we convert DS to a number of
bits that contain the same amount of watermark information. Note
that W:STAT needs massive memory in the embedding process (see
Section 3.2), which makes it impractical to embed the same amount
of watermark information. We embed 256 bits for it, as in the case
of [49].
5.3 Watermark Removal Attacks
We evaluate the following watermark removal attacks in our exper-
iments.
• Distillation [26], using a refining set and distilled for 500
epochs under different temperatures, i.e., 5, 10, and 15.
7
• Pruning [22], by pruning the parameters with different rates
(from 0.1 to 0.6) followed by fine tuning trained for 25 epochs.
• Rounding [22], by reducing the precision of the parameters
by 1 to 6 digits.
• Fine tuning [18], by retraining the model on the refining set
for 25 epochs.
• Expansion [28, 53], by expanding the convolutional layers to
linear combinations of smaller filters, for speedup rate ranging
from 2.5x to 3x. It is not applicable toMLPmodels (i.e., classifier
for MNIST).
For distillation and fine tuning attacks, we leave 20% of the
original training dataD as the refining setD ′. We use the remaining
80% training data for training the classifier. The student model
architectures in distillation are presented in the following.
• MNIST. The student model is a fully-connected neural net-
work with 2 hidden layers of 800 neurons, which is the same
architecture as in [26].
• CIFAR10. It is a standard convolutional neural network, a
succession of 2 convolutional layers with 64 (3×3) filters, a max
pooling layer, a convolutional layer with 128 (3×3) filters, a
max pooling layer, and 2 fully-connected layers of 200 neurons.
5.4 Evaluation Metrics
Embedding watermarks should preserve the classification accuracy
comparable to the clean model. We evaluate the performance of
a model using two metrics: classification accuracy and watermark
accuracy.
The classification accuracy reflects the model’s main classifica-
tion performance. It is measured on an independent test set. The
watermark accuracy is the accuracy in extracting the watermarks.
In P:∗ methods, it is measured by using the watermark-carrier set
DS to query the classifier Fw and counting the ratio of correct pre-
dictions to YS . In W:∗ methods, it is measured by extracting the
embedded watermark bits from the model and calculating the accu-
racy. To better compare the watermark accuracy among different
classifiers embedded using different methods, we normalize it as in
the following.
Aˆwm = max
(
Awm − 1c
1 − 1c
, 0
)
where Awm represents the watermark accuracy, c is the number
of values that the watermark can take (i.e., c equals to the number
of classes in P:∗ methods and c = 2 in W:∗ methods), and 1c is the
probability of random guess.
5.5 Embedding Performance
We depict the embedding performance of W:∗ and P:∗ methods
in Figure 4 and 5. The result shows that P:∗ methods and W:LSB
achieves 100% watermark accuracy, while the rest W:∗ methods
gets lower watermark accuracy. It is worth noting that ingrain leads
to a small drop (e.g., 1%∼5% for MNIST) in the model’s classification
accuracy, which is proportional to the ingrain coefficient λ. This is
because the λ controls the weight of the classification loss and the
ingrain loss during the training. A larger λ leads to more watermark
information ingrained in the model, but at the cost of losing more
classification accuracy. It is a trade off between the two accuracies.
We present the comprehensive evaluation result of embedding
performance in Table 2.
5.6 Embedding Robustness against Distillation
The W:∗ methods have no robustness against distillation because
the original classifier is replaced by a new classifier with smaller
size. All the original parameters in which the watermarks are em-
bedded are destroyed. Therefore, we only evaluate the robustness
of P:∗ methods. We first present all the evaluation results on the
robustness against distillation in Table 3. The result shows that
for each distillation temperature on each host classifier, there is at
least one λ that enables P:ING to embed watermarks with better
robustness than P:CAP.
We depict the robustness of P:∗methods for MNIST and CIFAR10
classifiers in Figure 6 and 7 under distillation T = 10. As it is
shown, P:CAP has almost no robustness to distillation. On the other
hand, P:ING preserves much more watermark information after
distillation. For example, P:ING achieves 22.4%∼32.7% watermark
accuracy for MNIST classifier when |DS | = 1, 000. As a trade off,
the classification accuracy drops only 1.3%∼2.6%. As expected, the
watermark accuracy (which reflects the embedding robustness) is
proportional to λ. We show the trajectories of the classification and
watermark accuracies of P:CAP and P:ING during the distillation
process in Figure 8, where λ = 2, distillationT = 10. The plots show
that there is no significant difference between the classification
accuracy of P:CAP and P:ING. However, as the model’s distillation
progresses, the ingrained model performs evidently better than the
alternative approach in terms of the watermark accuracy. This is
mainly because the outputs of the classifier on the refining dataset
D ′ (i.e., the training set of distillation but are drawn from px as
well) also contain the watermark information when the watermark
is ingrained in the classifier by P:ING. Whereas, P:CAP embeds
watermarks independently from the classifier’s main task, which
explains why the watermarks cannot be transferred to the student
model during distillation.
From the results, it is clear that a greater λ leads to a more robust
embedding, even on the 10,000 watermark-carrier data, where a λ of
8 causes 1% drop in embedding accuracy. Together, the present find-
ings confirm that ingrain does help attain a more robust watermark
embedding against distillation. Figure 8 compares the classification
and embedding accuracies of the two embedding techniques (P:CAP
and ingrain P:ING(2) with coefficient λ = 2) during distillation. As
the plots show, there is no significant difference between the classi-
fication accuracy of P:CAP and P:ING(2). However, as the model’s
distillation progresses, the ingrained model performs evidently
better than the alternative approach in terms of the embedding
accuracy. This is mainly because the outputs of the model on be-
nign data contain watermark information, when the watermark
is embedded using ingrain. Whereas, P:CAP embeds watermarks
independently from the model’s main task, which explains why the
watermarks cannot be transferred during distillation.
5.7 Embedding Robustness against Other
Attacks
We present the result of robustness evaluation of W:∗ and P:∗meth-
ods against other widely used attacks (i.e., pruning, rounding, fine
8
Table 2: Embedding performance. The classification and watermark accuracies are presented in white and gray columns re-
spectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ.
Prior Methods P:ING
|DS | D Clean W:LSB W:SGN W:COR W:STA P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
1,000 MNIST 0.98 0.02 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
CIFAR10 0.84 0 0.81 1 0.81 0.99 0.8 0.98 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
5,000 MNIST 0.98 0 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.92 1
CIFAR10 0.84 0 0.8 1 0.8 0.99 0.81 0.98 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
10,000 MNIST 0.98 0 0.98 1 0.99 1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
CIFAR10 0.84 0 0.79 1 0.8 0.99 0.8 0.98 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1
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Figure 4: Embedding performance. The host network is trained on MNIST. The size of DS is 1,000 (left), 5,000 (middle) and
10,000 (right) images. The ingrain coefficient λs in P:ING are labeled as different numbers in the dashed curves.
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Figure 5: Embedding performance. The host network is trained on CIFAR10. The size of DS is 1,000 (left), 5,000 (middle) and
10,000 (right) images. The ingrain coefficient λs in P:ING are labeled as different numbers in the dashed curves.
tuning and low-rank expansion) on the MNIST and CIFAR10 classi-
fiers in Table 4 and 5 respectively. The pruning rate is 0.4 and the
rounding is by 2 digits. We do not evaluate the expansion attack
on the MNIST classifier because it is a MLP model.
The result shows that, in the prior methods, W:∗ are generally
less robust than P:CAP, which again demonstrates the fragility of
W:∗ methods. For instance, the watermarks embedded by W:LSB
are completely removed by rounding attack and mostly removed
by pruning attack. W:STA embeds the watermarks into the overall
statistics of the network parameters as opposed to the individual
parameters as in the case of other W:∗ methods. Therefore, W:STA
is slightly more robust than other W:∗ methods. The low-rank
expansion attack does not touch all the parameters, but rather
expands several convolutional layers. The watermark information
that is embedded in the untouched parameters by W:∗ can survive
the expansion attack. Hence, expansion attacks is less harmful to the
embedded watermarks than the other attacks. The P:CAP method is
quite robust to these attacks compared to W:∗method. For example,
it achieves 97%∼100% watermark accuracy on both classifiers.
P:ING with λ ≤ 2 can achieve comparable watermark accuracy
to P:CAP on the MNIST classifier, and on the CIFAR10 classifier,
λ ≤ 4 leads to comparable watermark accuracy. This result shows
that the robustness of P:ING against other widely used attacks is
still comparable to the best result of existing methods. An inter-
esting finding from the tables is that a larger λ of P:ING tends to
result in lower watermark accuracy in the pruning and fine tuning
attacks. This is because both attacks require retraining the classifier
on a refining set D ′. The retraining process without the govern of
the ingrain loss, will drive the classifier to “forget” the previously
embedded watermarks. However, because D ′ is drawn from the
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Table 3: Embedding robustness against distillation. The classification and watermark accuracies are presented in white and
gray columns respectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ. The P:ING results that have better robustness
than P:CAP are labeled in bold type.
Prior Method P:ING
|DS | D T Clean P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
5 0.984 0.018 0.984 0.036 0.97 0.229 0.965 0.271 0.96 0.297 0.958 0.339 0.955 0.34
1,000 MNIST 10 0.982 0.02 0.983 0.037 0.969 0.224 0.964 0.261 0.96 0.288 0.957 0.307 0.956 0.327
15 0.982 0.019 0.982 0.032 0.969 0.197 0.966 0.242 0.962 0.262 0.96 0.279 0.959 0.281
5 0.817 0.006 0.816 0 0.79 0.009 0.772 0.088 0.755 0.13 0.739 0.151 0.724 0.181
CIFAR10 10 0.81 0.008 0.809 0 0.795 0.033 0.775 0.053 0.759 0.101 0.752 0.116 0.741 0.147
15 0.803 0.002 0.802 0.002 0.794 0.03 0.784 0.06 0.769 0.07 0.764 0.103 0.763 0.101
5 0.984 0 0.984 0.016 0.969 0.101 0.962 0.125 0.957 0.14 0.954 0.143 0.95 0.146
5,000 MNIST 10 0.982 0 0.982 0.02 0.967 0.096 0.962 0.119 0.958 0.134 0.955 0.143 0.953 0.143
15 0.982 0 0.982 0.016 0.969 0.082 0.964 0.107 0.96 0.121 0.957 0.128 0.956 0.132
5 0.817 0 0.815 0 0.803 0 0.799 0.012 0.778 0.022 0.766 0.032 0.748 0.042
CIFAR10 10 0.81 0 0.806 0 0.8 0.002 0.795 0.009 0.786 0.018 0.775 0.019 0.771 0.03
15 0.803 0 0.799 0 0.797 0 0.793 0.005 0.791 0.005 0.789 0.011 0.785 0.014
5 0.984 0 0.984 0.005 0.971 0.054 0.966 0.065 0.959 0.077 0.956 0.083 0.952 0.087
10,000 MNIST 10 0.982 0 0.982 0.007 0.969 0.047 0.965 0.061 0.961 0.073 0.957 0.083 0.955 0.083
15 0.982 0 0.981 0.006 0.971 0.037 0.966 0.052 0.963 0.066 0.961 0.071 0.958 0.072
5 0.817 0 0.815 0.004 0.802 0 0.796 0 0.797 0.007 0.782 0.009 0.77 0.018
CIFAR10 10 0.81 0 0.81 0.001 0.794 0.002 0.795 0.002 0.792 0.003 0.791 0.006 0.787 0.008
15 0.803 0 0.804 0 0.791 0 0.794 0.01 0.793 0.005 0.792 0.005 0.793 0.007
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Figure 6: Embedding robustness against distillation. The host network is trained on MNIST. The size of DS is 1,000 (first 2
columns), 5,000 (3rd column), and 10,000 (4th column) images. The result in the 1st column is obtained without augmenting
D with DS . The λs in P:ING are labeled as different numbers in the dashed curves. Distillation temperature is 10.
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Figure 7: Embedding robustness against distillation. The host network is trained on CIFAR10. The size of DS is 1,000 (first 2
columns), 5,000 (3rd column), and 10,000 (4th column) images. The result in the 1st column is obtained without augmenting
D with DS . The λs in P:ING are labeled as different numbers in the dashed curves. Distillation temperature is 10.
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Table 4: Embedding robustness against other attacks. The host network is trained on MNIST. The classification and water-
mark accuracies are presented in white and gray columns respectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ.
Numbers in the 2nd column represent the parameters for the corresponding attack.
Prior Methods P:ING
|DS | Attacks W:LSB W:SGN W:COR W:STA P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
1,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.97 0.24 0.98 0.53 0.97 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.93
Rounding(2) 0.97 0 0.98 0.75 0.97 0.41 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
Fine Tuning 0.99 0.27 0.99 0.59 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.97 1 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.95
5,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.52 0.98 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.76
Rounding(2) 0.97 0 0.97 0.74 0.97 0.4 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
Fine Tuning 0.98 0.28 0.98 0.6 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.97 1 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.88
10,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.52 0.99 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.64
Rounding(2) 0.97 0 0.97 0.75 0.97 0.4 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.9 1
Fine Tuning 0.99 0.26 0.99 0.59 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.97 1 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.84
Table 5: Embedding robustness against other attacks. The host network is trained on CIFAR10. The classification and water-
mark accuracies are presented in white and gray columns respectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ.
Numbers in the 2nd column represent the parameters for the corresponding attack.
Prior Methods P:ING
|DS | Attacks W:LSB W:SGN W:COR W:STA P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
1,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.8 0.26 0.8 0.42 0.81 0.52 0.81 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.8 0.95 0.79 0.92 0.77 0.82
Rounding(2) 0.8 0.01 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.48 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
Fine Tuning 0.81 0.31 0.82 0.52 0.8 0.58 0.8 0.98 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.77 0.9 0.75 0.83
Expansion 0.75 0.65 0.76 0.64 0.75 0.63 0.78 0.88 0.79 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.78 0.97 0.76 0.97 0.73 0.97 0.67 0.96
5,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.79 0.25 0.81 0.41 0.79 0.51 0.81 0.98 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.82 1 0.81 0.99 0.8 0.93 0.78 0.76
Rounding(2) 0.8 0 0.8 0.79 0.79 0.47 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
Fine Tuning 0.81 0.28 0.8 0.53 0.81 0.57 0.8 0.98 0.81 1 0.81 1 0.8 1 0.79 1 0.78 0.93 0.76 0.81
Expansion 0.75 0.64 0.76 0.63 0.74 0.63 0.78 0.88 0.79 0.97 0.8 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.74 0.97 0.69 0.96
10,000
Pruning(0.4) 0.79 0.25 0.79 0.42 0.79 0.52 0.81 0.98 0.83 0.97 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.99 0.81 0.97 0.8 0.94 0.78 0.65
Rounding(2) 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.48 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
Fine Tuning 0.8 0.32 0.8 0.52 0.8 0.57 0.8 0.98 0.82 0.99 0.81 0.99 0.79 0.99 0.8 0.97 0.79 0.94 0.77 0.8
Expansion 0.76 0.65 0.75 0.64 0.74 0.63 0.78 0.88 0.79 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.78 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.75 0.96 0.71 0.96
same data distribution px as the training set D, such effect is negli-
gible unless λ becomes large which ingrains the watermarks more
deeply in the network. We present the evaluation result against
pruning attack with more rates and rounding attack by more digits
in Table 6 and 7 respectively in Appendix.
6 RELATEDWORK
While DL-based systems are reported to attain very high accuracy
in various applications [24, 45], there remains some limitations
that hinder wide adoption of these systems. On the one hand, the
computational cost required to operate a neural networks can be
prohibitive, often surpassing resource that typically available onmo-
bile devices. On the other hand, various studies have demonstrated
fragility of DL models in the presence of adversarial attacks [10, 48].
Thus, motivated either by efficiency or security concerns, several
model transformation techniques have been studied in the liter-
ature [22, 26, 39]. Besides model adaptation, various techniques
have also been applied in security-related tasks, such as embedding
watermark information into a neural network [49], or creating a
backdoor in a model [20].
6.1 ML Privacy
Researches have strongly suggested that, similar to other data-
driven applications, ML poses a threat to privacy [5, 17, 44]. For
instance, given access to an ML model, an adversary can infer
non-trivial and useful information about its training set [5]. It has
also been shown that one can abuse the prediction output by an
ML model for an partially unknown input x to infer its unknown
features [17]. Following the same spirit, Shokri et al. [44] study
membership inference attacks against ML models, wherein an ad-
versary attempts to learn if a record of his choice is part of the
private training sets.
The above mentioned attacks on privacy indicate that benignly
trained ML models could leak certain information about its input
or training sets. Our study, on the other hand, examines how one
can intentionally abuse a model to embed a watermark in a robust
way.
6.2 Models Abusing
Model abusing has recently attracted a great attention from the
research community. The model abusing problems ask to which
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Figure 8: Trajectories of classification and watermark ac-
curacies during distillation. We compare P:CAP and P:ING
wherein λ = 2. Distillation temperature is 10.
extent one can exploit a deep learning model to learn or conduct an
additional task beyond the intended task that is associated with the
training set [41, 46, 49]. Arpit et al. [4] have shown that DL models
with sufficient capacity (i.e., having a large enough number of pa-
rameters) can “memorize” noise contained in training set, without
yielding poor generalization to real data samples. Song et al. [46]
explore another abuse which attempts to use the model as a covert
channel to convey some secret information (i.e., sensitive informa-
tion of the training set). The authors propose various approaches
to achieve this, including poisoning the training set, tampering
with the training procedure, or directly modifying parameters of
the model after training. Motivated by copyright protection of
ML models, Uchida et al. [49] investigated an approach that em-
ploys malicious embedding regularizers during training to force
the model parameters to observe certain statistical bias, which can
then be considered as a “watermark” of the model. These abuses
have been shown to offer impressive results, strongly indicating
that ML models can be abused for additional tasks beyond their
intended tasks.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear if the introduced features are
retained after the model undergoes typical ML transformations.
Our work, in contrast, experimentally shows that typical ML trans-
formations, especially distillation, are destructive to embedded wa-
termarks which are independent from the model’s main task.
6.3 Neural Networks in Adversarial Settings
Deep learning techniques, while achieving utmost accuracy in var-
ious application domains [25, 45], were not originally designed
with built-in security. However, recent years have witnessed an
ever increasing adoption of DL models for security-sensitive tasks,
which causes the accuracy of the models’ predictions to have signif-
icant implications on the security of the host tasks. Various works
have suggested that ML models are likely vulnerable in adversar-
ial settings [10, 15, 20]. In particular, an adversary could force a
victim model to deviate from its intended task and behave errati-
cally according to the adversary’s wish. The adversary can stage
these attacks by corrupting the training phase (e.g., poisoning the
training set with adversarial data [8, 32], employing adversarial
loss function [20]), maliciously modifying the victim model [10], or
feeding the victim model with adversarially crafted samples [19, 48]
in the testing phase.
6.4 Secure & Privacy-Preserving ML Training
In the wake of security and privacy threats posed to ML tech-
niques, much research has been devoted to provisioning secure and
privacy-preserving training of ML models [1, 35, 43]. For instances,
Abadi et al. studied a framework to train deep learning models
with differential privacy. Shokri et al. [43] proposed a protocol for
privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning, enables participants
to jointly train a model without revealing their private training
data. Bonawitz et al. [9] presented a solution for secure aggrega-
tion of high-dimensional data. In addition, systems for oblivious
multi-party machine learning have also been built using trusted
hardware primitive [35].
The threat models assumed by these techniques are to protect
privacy of users’ data contributed to the training set. Our work
studies a different threat model wherein the model owner partici-
pating in the training process intends to embed watermark in the
model.
6.5 Machine learning vs. Watermarking
Quiring et al. [40] discuss the similarities between machine learning
(ML) and watermarking (WM) research. They present two case
studies to illustrate such similarities. The first case examines the
use of “1.5-class classifier” technique in ML (combing two-class and
one-class models [7]) as a defense for oracle attack in WM, whereas
the second case study explores the use of stateful detector, which
is a common concept in WM, to mitigate model stealing/extraction
attacks in ML.
7 CONCLUSION
We empirically show that all the watermarks embedded by existing
methods can be removed by distillation attack. We design ingrain
technique as a countermeasure which mitigates the independence
between watermark embedding task and the main task inside the
model. Its robustness against other widely used transformations is
comparable to existing methods. Future work includes, but is not
limited to, investigating various ways of constructing the ingrainer
model, and further enhancing overall embedding robustness against
various transformations with minimal loss in the model’s main task
performance.
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Table 6: Embedding robustness against pruning attack. The classification and watermark accuracies are presented in white
and gray columns respectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ.
Prior Methods P:ING
|DS | D Rate Clean W:LSB W:SGN W:COR W:STA P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
0.1 0.98 0.02 0.99 0.27 0.99 0.59 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.99 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.93
0.2 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.29 0.99 0.6 0.98 0.49 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.93
0.3 0.99 0.02 0.97 0.26 0.98 0.56 0.97 0.45 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.93
0.4 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.24 0.98 0.53 0.97 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.93
1,000 MNIST 0.5 0.99 0.02 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.45 0.98 0.37 0.98 0.74 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.91
0.6 0.99 0.02 0.98 0.05 0.98 0.42 0.98 0.37 0.98 0.69 0.98 1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.88
0.1 0.83 0.01 0.81 0.31 0.82 0.52 0.8 0.58 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.98 0.8 0.95 0.79 0.88 0.77 0.79
0.2 0.82 0 0.81 0.35 0.81 0.56 0.82 0.63 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.81 0.93 0.79 0.9 0.77 0.79
0.3 0.83 0.01 0.8 0.32 0.81 0.52 0.82 0.58 0.81 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.95 0.79 0.91 0.76 0.76
0.4 0.83 0 0.8 0.26 0.8 0.42 0.81 0.52 0.81 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.8 0.95 0.79 0.92 0.77 0.82
CIFAR10 0.5 0.83 0 0.81 0.06 0.81 0.3 0.81 0.41 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 0.99 0.8 0.95 0.79 0.91 0.76 0.77
0.6 0.83 0.01 0.81 0 0.8 0.36 0.8 0.38 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.8 0.96 0.79 0.89 0.77 0.78
0.1 0.98 0 0.98 0.28 0.98 0.6 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.81
0.2 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.3 0.98 0.6 0.98 0.5 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.81
0.3 0.99 0 0.98 0.27 0.97 0.57 0.94 0.47 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.79
0.4 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.52 0.98 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.87 0.97 0.76
5,000 MNIST 0.5 0.99 0 0.99 0.13 0.97 0.44 0.98 0.36 0.98 0.74 0.98 1 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.81 0.97 0.69
0.6 0.99 0 0.98 0.05 0.97 0.41 0.98 0.37 0.98 0.69 0.98 1 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.86 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.69 0.97 0.57
0.1 0.83 0.01 0.81 0.28 0.8 0.53 0.81 0.57 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.81 0.93 0.8 0.91 0.78 0.7
0.2 0.82 0 0.8 0.35 0.81 0.55 0.8 0.62 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.97 0.81 0.93 0.78 0.75
0.3 0.83 0.01 0.8 0.34 0.8 0.54 0.8 0.58 0.81 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 0.99 0.8 0.94 0.78 0.76
0.4 0.83 0 0.79 0.25 0.81 0.41 0.79 0.51 0.81 0.98 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.82 1 0.81 0.99 0.8 0.93 0.78 0.76
CIFAR10 0.5 0.83 0 0.79 0.06 0.81 0.3 0.81 0.41 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.96 0.8 0.93 0.77 0.75
0.6 0.83 0 0.79 0 0.81 0.35 0.8 0.38 0.82 0.98 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.82 0.99 0.81 0.93 0.8 0.88 0.78 0.68
0.1 0.98 0 0.99 0.26 0.99 0.59 0.99 0.48 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.84 0.97 0.7
0.2 0.98 0 0.98 0.3 0.98 0.6 0.98 0.49 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.85 0.97 0.7
0.3 0.99 0 0.95 0.26 0.96 0.56 0.96 0.45 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.98 1 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.83 0.97 0.68
0.4 0.99 0 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.52 0.99 0.42 0.98 0.77 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.64
10,000 MNIST 0.5 0.99 0 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.44 0.98 0.37 0.98 0.74 0.98 1 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.9 0.97 0.81 0.97 0.7 0.97 0.55
0.6 0.99 0 0.98 0.05 0.98 0.41 0.98 0.37 0.98 0.69 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.77 0.97 0.66 0.97 0.55 0.97 0.44
0.1 0.83 0 0.8 0.32 0.8 0.52 0.8 0.57 0.82 0.98 0.82 0.95 0.82 0.97 0.81 0.97 0.81 0.97 0.81 0.92 0.79 0.63
0.2 0.82 0 0.8 0.35 0.8 0.56 0.8 0.63 0.82 0.98 0.82 0.94 0.81 0.95 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.97 0.81 0.93 0.79 0.68
0.3 0.83 0 0.79 0.32 0.8 0.54 0.79 0.58 0.81 0.98 0.82 0.97 0.81 0.99 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.97 0.81 0.93 0.78 0.66
0.4 0.83 0 0.79 0.25 0.79 0.42 0.79 0.52 0.81 0.98 0.83 0.97 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.99 0.81 0.97 0.8 0.94 0.78 0.65
CIFAR10 0.5 0.83 0 0.8 0.06 0.79 0.3 0.78 0.41 0.82 0.98 0.83 0.96 0.82 0.96 0.82 0.98 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.94 0.79 0.63
0.6 0.83 0 0.79 0 0.78 0.35 0.8 0.37 0.82 0.98 0.83 0.95 0.82 0.97 0.82 0.96 0.81 0.94 0.8 0.9 0.79 0.6
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Table 7: Embedding robustness against rounding attack. The classification and watermark accuracies are presented in white
and gray columns respectively. Numbers in the 2nd row under P:ING represent the λ.
Prior Methods P:ING
|DS | D #Digits Clean W:LSB W:SGN W:COR W:STA P:CAP 0.5 1 2 4 8
1 0.97 0.01 0.96 0.02 0.97 0.75 0.97 0.24 0.97 0.41 0.97 0.88 0.78 0.92 0.62 0.92 0.45 0.92 0.45 0.89 0.44 0.91
2 0.98 0.02 0.97 0 0.98 0.75 0.97 0.41 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
1,000 MNIST 3 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.07 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.52 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
4 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.11 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.56 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
5 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.17 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.59 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
6 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.25 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.72 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.93 1
1 0.79 0.02 0.75 0 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.24 0.76 0.96 0.8 0.93 0.75 0.88 0.74 0.95 0.75 0.95 0.72 0.97 0.69 0.97
2 0.83 0 0.8 0.01 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.48 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
CIFAR10 3 0.83 0 0.8 0.09 0.8 0.79 0.82 0.54 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
4 0.84 0 0.81 0.13 0.81 0.79 0.8 0.59 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
5 0.84 0 0.81 0.19 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.63 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
6 0.84 0 0.81 0.31 0.8 0.79 0.8 0.77 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 1 0.71 1
1 0.97 0.01 0.95 0.02 0.96 0.74 0.97 0.23 0.97 0.41 0.95 0.68 0.77 0.66 0.67 0.6 0.54 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.52
2 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.97 0.74 0.97 0.4 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
5,000 MNIST 3 0.98 0 0.98 0.07 0.97 0.74 0.97 0.52 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.92 1
4 0.98 0 0.98 0.11 0.98 0.74 0.98 0.56 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.92 1
5 0.98 0 0.98 0.17 0.98 0.74 0.97 0.58 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.92 1
6 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.25 0.98 0.74 0.98 0.72 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.92 1
1 0.79 0.02 0.76 0 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.24 0.76 0.96 0.79 0.9 0.76 0.92 0.74 0.89 0.73 0.93 0.72 0.95 0.7 0.91
2 0.83 0 0.8 0 0.8 0.79 0.79 0.47 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
CIFAR10 3 0.83 0 0.8 0.09 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.54 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
4 0.84 0 0.8 0.12 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.58 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
5 0.84 0 0.8 0.19 0.81 0.79 0.8 0.63 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
6 0.84 0 0.8 0.3 0.81 0.79 0.8 0.76 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.78 1 0.73 1
1 0.97 0 0.92 0.02 0.91 0.75 0.9 0.24 0.97 0.41 0.92 0.51 0.79 0.45 0.62 0.44 0.55 0.43 0.57 0.4 0.56 0.38
2 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.97 0.75 0.97 0.4 0.99 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.9 1
10,000 MNIST 3 0.98 0 0.97 0.07 0.97 0.75 0.97 0.51 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
4 0.98 0 0.97 0.11 0.97 0.75 0.98 0.56 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
5 0.98 0 0.97 0.17 0.97 0.75 0.98 0.59 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
6 0.98 0 0.98 0.25 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.72 0.98 0.8 0.98 1 0.97 1 0.96 1 0.95 1 0.94 1 0.91 1
1 0.79 0 0.75 0 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.23 0.76 0.96 0.8 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.71 0.85 0.7 0.87 0.69 0.68
2 0.83 0 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.48 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
CIFAR10 3 0.83 0 0.79 0.09 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.54 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
4 0.84 0 0.79 0.13 0.8 0.79 0.79 0.58 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
5 0.84 0 0.8 0.19 0.8 0.79 0.78 0.63 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
6 0.84 0 0.8 0.3 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.8 0.98 0.83 1 0.82 1 0.82 1 0.81 1 0.79 1 0.76 0.99
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